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I. SUPERMARKET SEMANTICS
Browsing the aisles of her local grocery store, a shopper may
come across a dusty unmarked bin with carrots in it. She may see a
shelf of brightly colored cereal boxes touting their contents' health
benefits. Elsewhere in the store may be an iced container of
sustainable shrimp from Thailand with a circled blue checkmark next
to it. Perhaps there are local leeks, organic okra, or eggs from free-
ranging chickens. The shopper may select the cereal on the basis of its
health claims, the shrimp on the basis of its environmental
friendliness, or maybe just the carrot because she is sick of all this
labeled nonsense.
Whatever the shopper's choices, the cacophony of product
labels has probably affected her selections.1 Her selections, in turn,
have probably affected sellers' product development and marketing
choices. Indeed, in response to growing interest in "green" goods, firms
are developing and marketing a multitude of new products with
environment-related attributes. 2 Many of these products bear labels
that are administered by private standards and certification systems,
such as MSC-certified seafood, UTZ-certified tea, Fairtrade coffee, or
Rainforest Alliance chocolate. Demand has prompted firms,
nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"), and private foundations to
invest hundreds of millions of dollars to support the creation and
implementation of such systems. 3 But the increase in privately
administered labels is not beneficial to all. In particular, these
systems often disadvantage firms that lack the resources or technical
expertise to achieve compliance with environmental standards,
1. For an overview of the effects of labels on consumer behavior, see generally Julie A.
Caswell & Daniel I. Padberg, Toward a More Comprehensive Theory of Food Labels, 74 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 460 (1992).
2. See, e.g., STEERING COMM. OF THE STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT OF STANDARDS &
CERTIFICATION, TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY: THE ROLES AND LIMITATIONS OF CERTIFICATION ES-4
(2012) [hereinafter CERTIFICATION REPORT] (providing data on the growth of ecolabels from 1964
through 2011, with a final count of 425 ecolabels in 246 countries and twenty-five industrial
sectors at the end of 2011); see also Green Is the New Black, ADWEEK (June 24, 2009),
http://www.adweek.com/newstadvertising-brandingtgreen-new-black-105996 (counting 458 new
products with "eco-friendly claims" entering the market in the first quarter of 2009 alone).
3. CERTIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. The CERTIFICATION REPORT itself was
commissioned by the David and Lucile Packard Foundation and the Walton Family Foundation
as each sought to better understand the impacts of its investments in the Marine Stewardship
Council and other private environmental-certification and environmental-labeling systems. Id. at
ES-5. Mars, Incorporated, having also recently committed to sourcing some of its ingredients
from sustainable sources, also supported the study. Id.
1402 [Vol. 65:5:1401
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barring them from access to the labels.4 One strategy that some
exporting countries have used to oppose publicly administered
environmental-certification and environmental-labeling systems is
through suit in the World Trade Organization ("WTO").5 The more
widespread support for private environmental labeling becomes, the
more likely it is that exporting countries may attempt to sue them in
the WTO as well. 6 When the activities of a private environmental-
labeling system are subject to WTO jurisdiction, however, is an open
question,7 and the subject of this Note.
This Note proposes an analytical framework for anticipating
the circumstances under which the WTO may claim jurisdiction over a
private environmental-certification and environmental-labeling
system. Part II reviews the WTO's role in the global trading regime,
discusses gaps and gap-filling organizations in the governance of
global trade, and situates the role of private environmental labeling in
the stream of global commerce. Part III analyzes the limits of the
WTO's jurisdictional reach and describes a four-factor test by which to
anticipate a claim of jurisdiction over a private environmental-labeling
system. Part IV outlines the likely complaint that will be filed and
4. See Manoj Joshi, Are Eco-Labels Consistent with World Trade Organization
Agreements?, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 69, 70-72 (2004) (arguing that environmental labeling "results
in discrimination against foreign producers and acts as a non-tariff barrier to trade" and
reviewing studies tending to demonstrate that the products of developing countries are the most
vulnerable to such discrimination); see also Sanford E. Gaines, Processes and Production
Methods: How to Produce Sound Policy for Environmental PPM-Based Trade Measures?, 27
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 383, 427 (2002) (describing developing countries' "vociferous opposition" to
environmental packaging and environmental labeling).
5. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and
the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 540-52 (2004) (discussing challenges
to product-labeling schemes in the WTO); infra Part III.A.2.
6. See Steven Bernstein & Erin Hannah, Non-State Global Standard Setting and the
WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 575, 575-78 (2008)
(noting the proliferation of transnational environmental standards developed by
nongovernmental systems and arguing that such systems will pose threats to the legitimacy of
the WTO as well as confusion to its dispute-settlement mechanism in the event of suit).
7. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Potential Role of Carbon
Labeling in a Green Economy, ENERGY ECONOMICS (SPECIAL ISSUE) (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 26-30), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/colloquium/
environmentalldocumentslMichaelThePotentialRole ofCarbonLabeling-inaGreenEcono
my.pdf (expressing uncertainty over the resolution of potential trade challenges relating to
private carbon-labeling schemes); see also Bernstein & Hannah, supra note 6, at 577, 604 (noting
that once firms join private certification and labeling schemes "they are subject to governance,
rules, and enforcement that have more in common with state regulation than standards of
voluntary bodies that can be abandoned with little consequences" and that there is "enough trade
law surrounding the issue that the temptation will be to develop it further to gain jurisdiction
over non-state social and environmental standardization systems").
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then applies the proposed framework to three prominent
environmental-labeling systems. This Note closes by arguing that the
WTO should only make jurisdictional claims over private
environmental labels under very narrow circumstances.
II. THE ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL TRADE
A. A Brief History of the WTO
The World Trade Organization is the sole multilateral
institution regulating the rules of global trade.8 It is the primary
source of international trade law and the principal forum at which
trade disputes are settled. 9 This Section traces the organization's
peculiar beginnings before discussing its present incarnation, dispute-
settlement mechanism, and record to date.
The WTO's origins lie in failed negotiations to create an
International Trade Organization ("ITO") in the wake of World War
II.10 The United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment sought
to create a specialized U.N. agency focused on trade and related issues
to avoid repeating the catastrophic trade policies of the interwar
years.11 Although an ITO charter was successfully negotiated, the
United States declined to ratify the agreement, and the rest of the
world, not wishing to join a trade organization in which the world's
largest trading economy was not involved, followed suit.12
The sole legal instrument to survive these negotiations was the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). 13 In contrast to
the more holistic hopes for an ITO, the GATT's substance was largely
8. What Is the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
whatis e.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
9. PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
59 (2d ed. 2008).
10. Id. at 78.
11. MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND
POLICY 2-3 (2d ed. 2006); see also Kyle Bagwell & Robert Staiger, The World Trade
Organization: Theory and Practice, 2010 ANN. REV. ECON. 223, 237-38 (discussing the
"protectionist outbreak" of the 1920s and 1930s and "spate of retaliatory tariffs" following the
enactment of the U.S. Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930); John H. Jackson, The Perils of
Globalization and the World Trading System, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 371, 372 (2000) (noting that
one of the primary objectives of the ITO and other Bretton Woods institutions was to "avoid the
problems that occurred in the inter-war period, which were blamed for leading to the Second
World War").
12. MATSUSHITA ETAL., supra note 11, at 2.
13. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 9, at 79.
1404 [Vol. 65:5:1401
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limited to tariff reductions on trade in goods. 14 Having come into
existence under a Protocol of Provisional Application in expectation of
the eventual establishment of an ITO-yet in the ongoing absence of
such an agency-the GATT became the de facto mechanism governing
international trade, a role it played for nearly fifty years. 15 But the
GATT grew, its needs grew with it, and calls for a "world trade
organization" began mounting in the early 1990s.1 6
On January 1, 1995, seventy-six member countries finished
negotiating the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization ('Marrakesh Agreement"), with a mandate recognizing
that trade policy should be used to raise standards of living, to ensure
full employment and economic growth, and to seek "the optimal use of
the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment
and to enhance the means for doing so."17 Annexed to the Marrakesh
Agreement are over sixty legal instruments ("Uruguay Round
agreements" or "WTO agreements"), including an updated and
extended version of the original GATT.18 With the exception of the
Annex 4 plurilateral agreements, all of the WTO agreements are
binding on all WTO members as a single body of law. 19
The WTO's near-universal membership notwithstanding,
neither joining nor staying in the club is easy. "Grandfather rights"
14. Id.
15. Id. at 80.
16. The GATT had a number of deficiencies as an international organization, foremost of
which was its lack of legal personality. Id. Stemming from this deficiency was the lack of clarity
surrounding the GATT's authority. Further, the Protocol of Provisional Application also
permitted "grandfather rights" by allowing parties to join the GATT system and still maintain
legislation inconsistent with the GATT. Id. Calls enumerating the GATT's defects came from the
academic and policy worlds alike. For an example of GATT-related critiques by one of the first
scholars to suggest a "world trade organization," see generally JOHN H. JACKSON,
RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM (1990).
17. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, pmbl., cl. 1, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note
9, at 84. Interestingly, the Marrakesh Agreement's first clause is a verbatim copy of the original
GATT's first clause, with the exception of the above-quoted portion referencing sustainability
and the environment. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, pmbl., cl. 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (setting out policy objectives as "raising
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding
the production and exchange of goods").
18. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 9, at 44.
19. Id. Unlike all other WTO agreements, the Annex 4 agreements require separate
consent, and such consent is not required in order to become a member of the WTO. Id.
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and reservations are not permitted,20 and negotiations for accession
have, in some cases, taken decades. 21 Once admitted, members'
obligations are both positive and negative, substantive and procedural
in nature. Members must actively ensure the conformity of their laws,
regulations, and administrative procedures with WTO obligations.
22
They are also prohibited from undertaking a range of trade measures,
such as the imposition of import quotas. 23 Substantive obligations
include tariff commitments, as well as most-favored-nation ("MFN")
and national-treatment obligations. 24 Procedural obligations include
mandatory submission to WTO review of national trade policies and,
perhaps most importantly, to the WTO's system of dispute
settlement. 25
20. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 17, at art. XVI:5; MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 11,
at 7.
21. China, for example, was required to negotiate a number of bilateral market access
agreements, notably with the United States and the European Union, before an accession
protocol would even be discussed. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 9, at 113. The entire process
took fourteen years and resulted in nine hundred pages of legal text. Id. China acceded to the
WTO in 2001. Id. In a more recent example, Russia only acceded to the WTO in 2012, following
protracted negotiations that began in 1993 and stalled over disagreements regarding its
domestic energy prices. See Accessions: Russian Federation, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/acc-e/alrussiee.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2012)
(announcing Russia's accession); see also David Jolly, WT.O. Grants Russia Membership, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/17/business/global/wto-accepts-russia-bid-
to-join.html? pagewanted=all (discussing the lengthy negotiations).
22. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 17, at art. XVI:4; see also Sylvia Ostry, WTO:
Institutional Design for Better Governance, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY AND LEGITIMACY: THE
MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 361, 363-64 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds.,
2001) (discussing WTO's growing role as a regulator requiring action rather than only
prohibiting trade discrimination).
23. See, e.g., GATT, supra note 17, at art. XI (prohibiting import quotas).
24. GATT Article I sets out the MFN principle: "[A]ny advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating
in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties." GATT, supra note 17, at art. I.
Under the MFN principle, also called the nondiscrimination principle, any trade concession one
country grants to another must then be extended to all members of the WTO. See Bagwell &
Staiger, supra note 11, at 244-47, for a discussion of the benefits of MFN from an economist's
perspective. GATT Article III, in turn, sets out the national treatment principle, under which
products may not be treated any differently from domestic products after having entered the
domestic market in question. GATT, supra note 17, at art. III.
25. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art.
23.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] ("When Members seek the redress of a violation of
obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an
impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have
recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.").
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The WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism ("DSM") has been
characterized as "the central pillar of the multilateral trading system
and the WTO's most individual contribution to the stability of the
global economy." 26 It stands out among international tribunals as a
particularly legalistic, rules-oriented approach to dispute settlement
in lieu of the more consultative, negotiation-based approaches that
characterize many other international dispute -settlement tribunals. 27
For example, the DSM's jurisdiction is compulsory and exclusive in
nature; it automatically grants requests for adjudication, provides for
strict deadlines in proceedings, and grants itself the authority to
determine the "reasonable time" allowed to offending members to
comply with rulings.28 The DSM has also been among the most prolific
international tribunals, having handled over four hundred disputes in
its less than thirty years of existence. 29 The range of members availing
themselves of the DSM has been broad, with significant participation
by both the developed and developing worlds. 30
Although Part III will address the WTO's jurisdictional
analysis, an understanding of the mechanics of a dispute and
available remedies may provide insights into the circumstances under
which future suits will be filed. In a typical dispute, one member will
complain that another has failed to comply with its obligations,
26. Renato Ruggiero, Director-General, World Trade Org., Address to the Korean Business
Association (Apr. 17, 1997), available at http://www.wto.org/englishlnews..e/sprr-e/seoul_e.htm;
see also JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 124 (2d ed. 1997) (describing the WTO dispute-settlement process as "an
achievement that may be the core 'linchpin' of the whole trading system and the effective
implementation" of the WTO agreements).
27. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 9, at 180. Interestingly, in the discussions leading to
DSM's creation, some feared that such a judicialized approach would diminish the WTO's
credibility because members would ignore the DSM's decisions when they were not in the
national interest. These fears do not appear to have been born out. See Andrew T. Guzman,
Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 303, 321 (2004) (observing that the DSM's
procedural rules set within a mandatory dispute-settlement system "halve] produced a
mechanism that is the envy of other international institutions").
28. DSU, supra note 25, at arts. 4.3, 6.1, 16.4, & 21.3. For a reiteration of the exclusive
nature of WTO jurisdiction, see Panel Report, United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of
1974, 7.49, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999) (interpreting Article 23.1 to "imposejon all Members
[a requirement] to have recourse to the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek
the redress of a WTO inconsistency .... Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute
settlement system to the exclusion of any other system .... This, what one would call exclusive
dispute resolution clause, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under
the DSU." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
29. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 9, at 169; Chronological List of Disputes Cases, WORLD
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/ english/tratope/dispu._e/dispu statuse.htm (last visited Sept.
18, 2012).
30. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 9, at 169.
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thereby nullifying or impairing the benefits of membership accruing to
the complaining member. 31 Members are frequently persuaded by
businesses to file such complaints, and members are deemed to have
standing when they consider that so doing "would be fruitful" and
would "secure a positive solution to a dispute."32 This language has
been interpreted broadly. 33 A member has never been determined not
to have standing.34
Following the complaint, a mandatory consultation phase
begins.35 If the dispute is not settled during consultations, then the
complainant may resort to adjudication by requesting the
establishment of a dispute-settlement panel. 36 Panels are usually
composed of three individuals chosen from lists of experts maintained
by the WTO Secretariat.37 Once appointed, the panel accepts written
submissions from parties and third parties, holds hearings, and, when
it deems necessary, consults experts for assistance. 38 The panel then
issues a ruling, and in the event of disagreement, any party to the
dispute may then appeal that ruling to the Appellate Body. 39 Unlike
the panels, the Appellate Body is a standing group of seven
31. Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 11, at 240.
32. DSU, supra note 25, at art. 3.7 ("Before bringing a case, a Member shall exercise its
judgement as to whether action under these procedures would be fruitful. The aim of the dispute
settlement mechanism is to secure a positive solution to a dispute.").
33. For example, in one case the United States had sued the European Communities with
regard to import measures relating to bananas. Europe argued that the United States had no
"legal interest" in the dispute because U.S. banana production was minimal and, moreover, the
United States does not export bananas. The Appellate Body held that the United States did have
standing to bring the claim, writing:
[A] Member is expected to be largely self-regulating in deciding whether any such
action would be 'fruitful.' . . . We agree that neither Article 3.3 nor 3.7 of the DSU
nor any other provision of the DSU contains any explicit requirement that a Member
must have a 'legal interest' as a prerequisite for requesting a panel. We do not accept
that the need for a legal interest is implied in the DSU or in any other provision of
the WTO Agreement.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation and Distribution of
Bananas, 142, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
34. MATSUSHITA ETAL., supra note 11, at 114.
35. DSU, supra note 25, at art. 3.7.
36. DSU, supra note 25, at art. 6.1. Other methods of dispute settlement are available, but
adjudication is the most common choice. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 11, at 115.
37. MATSUSHITA ETAL., supra note 11, at 115.
38. DSU, supra note 25, at art. 13.2. The Appellate Body appears to have--or at least to
have taken-broad authority to conduct its own fact finding. In one case, the Appellate Body
permitted a panel to base its findings on evidence that had not even been shown to the parties to
the dispute. Appellate Body Report, Thailand-Anti-Dumping Duties on Angles, Shales and
Sections of Iron or Non-Alloy Steel and H-Beams from Poland, WT/DS122/ABR (Apr. 5, 2001).
39. DSU, supra note 25, at art. 17.4.
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individuals appointed to four-year terms. 40 Its members are selected
on the basis of their expertise in trade law and their
representativeness of the WTO's membership.41 They are not affiliated
with any government and are prohibited from accepting or seeking
instruction from any international, governmental or nongovernmental
organization, or any private source.42 Like the panels, however, the
Appellate Body also hears cases in divisions of three.43 The Appellate
Body may affirm, modify, or reverse the panel. Typically, parties to
the dispute must unconditionally accept panel and Appellate Body
rulings. 44 These rulings are not only binding on the parties to the
dispute but also retain some persuasive authority over future
adjudication. 45 However, the DSM is not a common law jurisdiction.
Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU') provides
that rulings "cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements."46 Only the WTO's executive
bodies, the General Council, and the more senior Ministerial
Conference may adopt authoritative interpretations of the WTO
agreements. 47
If the complaining member prevails in a dispute, then several
remedies become available. Typically, a panel or the Appellate Body
recommends that the offending member bring its measures into
conformance with the ruling within a reasonable period of time.48 If
the offending member fails to do so, the harmed member may seek
trade sanctions in the form of either compensation or retaliation. With
40. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 9, at 259.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. DSU, supra note 25, at art. 17.14.
45. See David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidis, The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law, 92
AM. J. INT'L L. 398, 401 (1998) (stating that adopted reports have "strong persuasive power" and
may be thought of as a form of "nonbinding precedent"). With regard to the persuasive authority
of GATT reports in particular, see also Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages, 108, WTIDS1O/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R (Oct. 5, 1996) [hereinafter Japan-Alcoholic
Beverages] ("Adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis. They are often
considered by subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations among WTO Members
and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.").
46. DSU, supra note 25, at art. 3.2. This observation is repeated later in the DSU as well.
See id. at art. 19.2 ("[T]he panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the rights and
obligations provided in the covered agreements.").
47. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 9.2 ("The Ministerial Conference and the
General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement
and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements.").
48. DSU, supra note 25, at art. 19.1.
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regard to the former, members may negotiate directly on the
appropriate level of compensation, generally made in the form of
additional trade concessions. 49 If compensation is not offered or if an
offer is rejected, the harmed member may retaliate with
discriminatory suspension of tariff concessions.50 The WTO must
authorize and monitor the retaliation. 51 Retaliatory measures must be
equivalent to the nullification or impairment, and the WTO prefers
"parallel" retaliation through suspension of concessions in the same
economic sector at issue in the dispute.52 In practice, members rarely
resort to remedial measures, but the DSM's record of successful
dispute settlement suggests that they serve as credible threats
providing sufficient deterrence to ongoing infringement of the WTO
agreements. 53
In sum, then, the WTO is arguably the most influential
international organization ever created.54 It is also the youngest. 55 Its
exceptional history places it squarely outside of the U.N. system, yet
its membership covers most of the world. Members have been largely
compliant with the many elements of their obligations, and when
compliance has been questionable, the DSM has proved a strikingly
effective means for both remedy and enforcement. 56
But the WTO's peculiar mix of broad influence and specific
focus has also garnered significant criticism.57 Member obligations
49. Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 11, at 240.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 224 ("The GATT/WTO is widely acknowledged to be one of the most successful
international institutions ever created.").
55. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 9, at 76.
56. See Alan Win. Wolff, Problems with WTO Dispute Settlement, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 417,
417-20 (2001) (describing the merits of the DSM); see also Guzman, supra note 27, at 321
(observing that the DSM's procedural rules set within a mandatory dispute settlement system
"has produced a mechanism that is the envy of other international institutions").
57. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 27, at 304 (noting some critics' argument that "the
tremendous power of the organization, combined with its efforts to influence policies in non-trade
areas, has elevated trade at the expense of other issues"); see also LORI WALLACH & MICHELLE
SFORZA, THE WTO: FIVE YEARS OF REASONS TO RESIST CORPORATE GLOBALIZATION 27 (1999)
("The WTO has been a disaster for the environment."); Guy de Jonqui6res Prime Target for
Protests, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1999, at 11 (describing the WTO as "pathologically secretive,
conspiratorial and unaccountable to sovereign states and their electorate"); Geoffirey Lean, Trade
Wars-The Hidden Tentacles of the World's Most Secret Body, THE INDEPENDENT (London), July
18, 1999, at 13 (describing the WTO as "what is probably the most powerful organisation on
Earth" and arguing that the way it has used its "powers is leading to a growing suspicion that its
initials should really stand for World Take Over," noting also that "[i]n a series of rulings it has
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requiring affirmative government action have placed the WTO in the
sometimes awkward position of adjudicating the legality of national
laws that may not deal exclusively or even primarily with trade.58
Although the WTO's evolution out of the GATT system represents in
part a recognition of the impracticability of addressing trade
separately from other global challenges, it has been widely criticized
for its arguably myopic focus on trade to the detriment of other
concerns, such as human rights, labor, and the environment. 59
The massive protests leading to the collapse of the 1999 WTO
Ministerial Conference in Seattle served to highlight the
dissatisfaction among many with the WTO's role in global
governance. 60 The WTO's own launch of the Doha Development Round
in 2001 represents a significant attempt by members to respond to
these concerns by including issues not directly related to trade in
WTO negotiations. Now over one decade old, however, the Doha
Development Round remains stalled, numerous calls to reinvigorate it
notwithstanding.61
B. Gaps in Trade Governance: The Case of the Environment
Concerns over trade and the environment were among the most
visible in the Seattle protests, and not without reason. Such concerns
struck down measures to help the world's poor, protect the environment, and safeguard health in
the interests of private-usually American-companies"). Foreign policy commentator Daniel
Drezner has noted that fewer protests have occurred regarding recent WTO activities and
suggests that this is evidence of its lack of progress on issues such as those established in the
Doha Round, and he has noted "this is a bad sign for trade." Why is the WTO Protest-Free?,
FOREIGN POL'Y (Sept. 15, 2010, 5:41 PM), http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/
2010/09/15/whyis.thewto_protest_free. One reasonable interpretation of the recent decline in
interest in the WTO takes into account the global financial crisis and recession, which has
shifted much civil attention to financial institutions and away from trade. Id.
58. See Guzman, supra note 27, at 303 (noting that the WTO is "engaged in monitoring and
adjudicating the legality of domestic rules that are not primarily or exclusively about trade").
59. See Lean, supra note 57; see also DANIEL C. ESTY, THE GREENING OF THE GATT 42
(1994) (enumerating environmentalists' critiques of the GATT and proposing ways to permit the
GATT framework to improve on its otherwise poor record of permitting sovereign nations to
regulate environmental harms); Margaret Graham Tebo, Power Back to the People, 86 A.B.A. J.
52, 54 (2000) (noting that a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, shortly in advance of
the Seattle meetings, commented that it was important to make labor standards, environmental
standards, and human rights as important to "our trade bureaucrats" as more traditional trade
issues).
60. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 27, at 304 (describing the 1999 Ministerial Conference as
a "dramatic failure").
61. E.g., Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Op-Ed., The Wrong Way to Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/opinion/25bhagwati.html.
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encompass a range of sensitive issues, including whether countries
gain competitive advantage by lowering their environmental
standards, whether the increased economic activity caused by
globalized trade leads to unsustainable use of natural resources, and
whether governments use the rules of global trade to avoid or override
environmental regulation.
Scholars of trade and the environment have identified two
specific sets of threats to the environment posed by the globalization of
trade. 62 First, the use of resources from developing countries to
support consumer demand in developed countries can lead to
environmental harms within developing countries that are not
internalized by developed-country consumers. 63 Second, the use of
resources from global commons can contribute to harms such as
resource exhaustion-in the case of open-seas fisheries, for example-
and global climate change. 64
These two sets of threats have proved difficult to address by
the traditional actors in global governance, namely, states and the
international organizations they create. In the case of states,
exporting countries may lack the expertise or resources to regulate
domestic resource usage. 65 Also, domestic needs may be so urgent that
economic growth becomes imperative, regardless of environmental
harms. 66 Across exporting countries, such conditions may give rise to
race-to-the-bottom dynamics in which countries compete for business
by offering the most permissive regulatory regime. 67 Importing
countries, in turn, cannot regulate firms operating outside of their
62. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in
Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 919 (2007).
63. Id. Given the increasing number and severity of environmental harms caused by
globalized trade, scholars have begun to propose an increasingly broad array of potentially WTO-
compliant environmental measures. See, e.g., Jon M. Truby, Towards Overcoming the Conflict
Between Environmental Tax Leakage and Border Tax Adjustment Concessions for Developing
Countries, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 149 (2010) (arguing that border tax adjustments may be a
WTO-compliant method for addressing environmental leakages posed by the globalization of
trade).
64. Vandenbergh, supra note 62, at 919.
65. Id.; see also Errol E. Meidinger, Forest Certification as Environmental Law Making by
Global Civil Society, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF FOREST CERTIFICATION 293, 309
(Errol Meidinger, Chris Elliott & Gerhard Oesten eds., 2003) (discussing the "painfully slow"
character of nation-state negotiations and contrasting them with the "remarkably rapid" growth
in border-crossing environmental problems).
66. Vandenbergh, supra note 62, at 920.
67. See Ian Sheldon, Trade and Environmental Policy: A Race to the Bottom?, 57 J. AGRIC.
ECON. 365, 368 (2006) (discussing race to the bottom dynamics with regard to agriculture-related
regulatory regimes).
1412 [Vol. 65:5:1401
WARNING: MAY CA USE WARMING
sovereign borders. When such firms do operate within the importing
state's borders, the state may nonetheless also lack the political will to
regulate, particularly when large, profitable multinational
corporations ("MNCs") are involved. Citizens of importing states who
hold preferences for reducing global environmental harms face
enormous collective-action problems in inducing their governments to
act.68 These problems may be exacerbated by the fact that both the
activity and the resultant harm took place in a distant country,
diminishing the sense of necessity or urgency. Finally, firms operating
in importing and exporting states alike all have obvious incentives for
overusing global commons resources.
In the case of international organizations, U.N. attempts to
directly regulate firms operating across sovereign borders have been
met with severe opposition and remain unlikely to succeed.69 U.N.
efforts to regulate states' usage of global commons resources, and
particularly to mitigate climate change, have also been contentious.
Even if a U.N. process does produce an agreement on global commons
issues, implementation and enforcement still pose significant
challenges.
Although the WTO itself has recognized the important
relationship between trade and the environment, 70 it remains
emphatic in its stance that its regulatory duties extend only to trade.
71
The factual record does not offer much cause for hope. When
confronted with environment-related trade disputes, the DSM has
almost invariably struck down measures favoring greater
environmental protection. 72
The environmental threats posed by the globalization of trade
thus constitute significant gaps in global governance. As mentioned
above, some individuals do hold preferences for more and better
environmental regulation. Although their governments may remain
unresponsive to these preferences, individuals may also express
68. Vandenbergh, supra note 62, at 920.
69. See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 208-09
(3d ed. 2010) (discussing the U.N. Human Rights Commission's Draft Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations and the severe opposition to it); see also United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development, Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc.
E/1990/94 (June 12, 1990).
70. As discussed above, the goals of sustainable development and environmental
stewardship remain enshrined in the Marrakesh Agreement itself. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
71. See infra Part III.A.2.
72. See infra Part III.A.2 and accompanying notes.
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preferences in their capacity as consumers in private markets. And
markets, of course, can be highly responsive to consumer behavior.
C. The Gap Fillers: Private Environmental Governance
Private forms of governance can often arise to meet unfulfilled
public demands for governance.7 3 Indeed, private institutions have
already done significant work to fill the gaps in global environmental
governance.74 As consumers have expressed preferences for goods
produced by more sustainable practices, firms have responded by
offering them. To do so, firms often participate in standard setting,
either collectively or unilaterally. 75 Once set, the private standards
affect firms' choices about issues such as which goods to produce, how
to produce them, and which products to buy for use as inputs.76
Certification and labeling systems are a particularly formalized
version of standard setting.7 7 At the center of a certification and
labeling system is the standard, or defined set of criteria, to which the
regulated product must conform.78 The standard is then coupled with
a certification program through which formal decisions on compliance
are made. These decisions are often based on the results of an audit or
assessment conducted by an accreditation body.7 9 This body is
73. Thomas P. Lyon, Environmental Governance: An Economic Perspective, in
GOVERNANCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES 34, 51-54 (Magali A. Delmas & Oran
R. Young eds., 2009) (arguing that demand for governance with regard to environmental issues
in particular sometimes arises from consumers seeking products from firms that have a record of
fair treatment and payment of their workers and/or environmentally responsible operations).
There is an extensive body of literature that characterizes these systems as "non-state market
driven" ("NSMD") governance systems. See, e.g., Graeme Auld, Cristina Balboa, Steven
Bernstein & Benjamin Cashore, The Emergence of Non-State Market-Driven (NSMD) Global
Environmental Governance: A Cross-Sectoral Assessment, in GOVERNANCE FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT: NEW PERSPECTIVES 183 (Magali A. Delmas & Oran R. Young eds., 2009). For a
broader description of consumer "voting" through the process of revealed preference and
consumption, see Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the
Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377, 381-85 (1998).
74. Bernstein & Hannah, supra note 6, at 579 ("[M]ost NSMD systems have emerged
where international agreements are either weak or absent, leaving them as one of the few viable
alternatives to regulate or socially embed the global marketplace.").
75. Vandenbergh, supra note 62, at 921-22. Internal firm procurement policies are an
example of unilateral standard setting. This Note addresses collective systems of standard
setting.
76. Id.
77. Tracey M. Roberts, Innovations in Governance: A Functional Typology of Private
Governance Institutions, 22 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POLy F. 67, 84 (2011) (discussing certification and
labeling systems).
78. CERTIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 9.
79. Id. at 10.
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typically responsible for evaluating the competence of the certification
program and of auditors.80 A logo-licensing or marketing body may be
a legally separate but linked organization that creates and grants the
final label.8 ' Other organizations may support the labeling system by
assisting in capacity building in less-developed areas or reporting on
the overall effects of the system.8 2 In short, these systems have the
effect of subjecting the regulated firms to "governance, rules, and
enforcement that have more in common with state regulation than
standards of voluntary bodies that can be abandoned with little
consequence."83
The WTO itself recognizes the growing importance of
environmental-certification and environmental-labeling systems, as
well as the complex trade-related issues they raise. In 2001, the
Ministerial Conference assigned its Committee on Trade and
Environment ("CTE") to take up the issue of environmental labeling
with the goal of recommending areas in need of clarity or additional
negotiation. 84 Since doing so, the CTE has acknowledged that labeling
systems can be economically efficient, useful for consumers, and less
trade restrictive when they are voluntary, market based, transparent,
and allow for open participation in their design.8 5 But it remains
concerned that environmental-labeling systems could also be veiled
barriers to trade.8 6 In general, the CTE now appears to have been
studying these systems for over a decade without taking any
particular stance on them.
Lacking authoritative guidance on environmental labels from
the Ministerial Conference or General Council, the DSM has remained
skeptical.8 7 It has struck down numerous government-administered
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. This is not to say that all labeling systems are responsible stewards of the
environment. For a discussion of product-labeling and marketing schemes that aim to take
advantage of consumer demand for green goods without offering legitimate environmentally
responsible behavior, see generally Thomas Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Greenwash: Corporate
Environmental Disclosure Under Threat of Audit, 20 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 3, 3-41
(defining and describing "greenwashing").
83. Bernstein & Hannah, supra note 6, at 577.
84. Items on the CTE's Work Programme, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/envir_ecte00_e.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
85. The CTE maintains a web page on environmental-labeling systems where it lays out
these concerns. See Labelling, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/envir_e/
labelling-e.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
86. Id.
87. As discussed in Part II.A, only the Ministerial Conference and General Council have
the authority to adopt binding interpretations of the WTO agreements as they apply to specific
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programs, the most recent of which was the U.S. dolphin-safe tuna
label.88 Given the Conference's silence on and the DSM's apparent
antipathy for environmental labels, a WTO claim of jurisdiction over
the activities of a private environmental-labeling system could lead to
significant, negative consequences for the systems themselves, the
firms that have invested in them, and the private consumer who-in
attempt to fulfill her unmet demand for environmental governance-
wishes to express her preferences through private market activity.
III. EDGES OF THE ARCHITECTURE: WTO's JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS
Before the WTO could adjudicate any issue regarding a private
environmental-labeling system's activities, it would, of course, need to
have jurisdiction over the dispute. The WTO must satisfy two
jurisdictional requirements in order to adjudicate any dispute. 89 First,
it must have jurisdiction over the "basis" of the dispute.90 The basis is
the dispute's cause of action, or subject matter. 9' Second, it must have
jurisdiction over the "object" of the dispute. The object of the dispute is
the party against whom the cause of action is directed.92 The question
of when a private environmental-labeling system may be subject to
WTO jurisdiction may thus be considered in two parts. First, when
will the activities of an environmental-labeling system give rise to a
valid basis for a dispute? Second, when will the activities of a private
organization give rise to a valid object of that dispute? This Part
considers those two questions in turn.
A. Basis of the Dispute
This Section describes the WTO's jurisdictional analysis with
respect to the basis of a dispute. It begins with a description of the
general rules by which the WTO may take jurisdiction over the basis
circumstances. See also Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 17, at art. 9.2 ("The Ministerial
Conference and the General Council shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations
of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade Agreements."). For a discussion of the history of
cases to have come before the WTO involving environmental labels, see infra Part III.A.2.
88. See infra Part III.A.2.
89. The WTO's Dispute Settlement System Training Module provides a helpful overview of
its jurisdiction. See Possible Object of a Complaint-Jurisdiction of the Panels and the Appellate
Body, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu.e/disp-settlement
cbt e/c5slpl-e.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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of the dispute and then analyzes the cases in which the WTO has
applied these rules to disputes involving environmental-certification
and environmental-labeling systems.
1. Violations, Non-Violations, and the Kitchen Sink
The WTO has nearly unlimited latitude in determining
whether it has jurisdiction over the basis of a dispute. Under Article
1.1 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, the WTO's jurisdiction
extends over all disputes arising under the covered WTO
agreements.93 Each of the covered agreements contains at least one
dispute-settlement provision setting out the available causes of
action.94 Most of the covered agreements adopt the GATT provisions
on dispute settlement by reference to GATT Articles XXII and XXIII. 95
Under GATT Article XXIII:1, a member may invoke the DSM if it
considers that any benefit accruing directly or indirectly to it is being:
nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being
impeded as a result of:
(a) the failure of another Member to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or
(b) the application by another Member of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with
the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation. 96
These three causes of action are termed violation, non-
violation, and situation complaints, respectively. Notably, the Article's
introductory clause also requires a resultant harm to the suing
member, namely, nullification, impairment, or impediment.
Violation complaints are the most common basis of a dispute.
In order to succeed on this ground, the complainant must establish
that the responding member has, not surprisingly, violated at least
one of its obligations. 97 Importantly, when a panel or the Appellate
Body finds a violation, it presumes the harm, and the complainant
93. DSU, supra note 25, at art. 1.1.
94. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 9, at 182.
95. Id. All of the WTO agreements discussed in this Note adopt the GATT provisions on
dispute settlement.
96. GATT, supra note 17, at art. XXIII:1.
97. Alan Yanovich & Tania Voon, What Is the Measure at Issue?, in CHALLENGES AND
PROSPECTS FOR THE WTO 115, 118 (Andrew Mitchell ed., 2005).
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need not demonstrate nullification, impairment, or impediment.98
Although this presumption is theoretically rebuttable, no respondent
has successfully overcome it. 99
Non-violation and situation complaints rarely form the basis of
a dispute, but their potential effects are far reaching. A non-violation
complaint can succeed even if the responding member has complied
with all of its enumerated obligations. 100 Non-violation complaints
have been rare, however, and none has succeeded. 10' The Appellate
Body has further stated that non-violation remedial measures "should
be approached with caution and should remain... exceptional."'0 2 No
situation complaint has ever been filed; yet, in theory, such a
complaint could succeed in the absence of any action at all by a
member. Notwithstanding these two complaints' infrequent
invocation, their availability remains notable for the broad scope that
they grant to the WTO in determining whether a cause of action is
justiciable.
2. Violations by Environmental Labels, and the Kitchen Sink
The history of cases involving government-administered
environmental-labeling systems may provide a framework for
anticipating the basis for disputes involving private systems. This
history suggests that violation complaints may be filed under both the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ('TBT") and the GATT. It
also suggests that environmental-labeling systems may be excepted
from liability under GATT Article XX, but that such exception is
unlikely.
The TBT would likely be the most relevant agreement in a suit
against a private environmental-labeling system for at least three
reasons. First, the WTO has construed the TBT provisions covering
mandatory standards established by governmental bodies (termed
"technical regulations") in a way that blurs the line between
98. DSU, supra note 25, at art. 3.8 ("In cases where there is an infringement of the
obligations assumed under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to
constitute a case of nullification or impairment. This means that there is normally a
presumption that a breach of the rules has an adverse impact on other Members parties to that
covered agreement, and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint
has been brought to rebut the charge.").
99. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 9, at 184.
100. Yanovich & Voon, supra note 97, at 119.
101. VAN DEN BOSSCHE, supra note 9, at 185.
102. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-containing Products, 186, WT/DS135/AB[R (Mar. 12, 2001).
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mandatory and voluntary, rendering ostensibly voluntary systems
subject to high levels of scrutiny.10 3 Second, the test adopted to
determine whether technical regulations violate national -treatment
principles may be self-fulfilling when applied to many labeling
programs. Third, in cases of conflicting provisions, the TBT prevails
over GATT, and as such, TBT claims are usually evaluated first.10 4
In May 2012, the Appellate Body addressed all three of these
issues in a decision with potentially far-reaching consequences for
environmental labels reviewed under the TBT. In this case, Mexico
sued the United States for alleged violations of both the TBT and the
GATT. The U.S. measures at issue related to a U.S. Department of
Commerce dolphin-safe label for canned-tuna products.10 5  The
Appellate Body held that the program, which identifies tuna caught
using methods that tend not to harm dolphins, violates national-
treatment principles embodied in TBT Article 2.1 because it "has a
detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities of Mexican tuna
products" in the U.S. market. 106
With regard to the first issue, the decision suggests that the
WTO may take an exceptionally broad view of the meaning of
"mandatory" under the TBT. 1'07 This finding is significant because it
103. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 2.1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120
[hereinafter TBT] (providing that "in respect of technical regulations, products imported from the
territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to
like products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country"). By
providing that imported products receive treatment that is not less favorable than that accorded
to like products of national origin, Article 2.1 thus provides that national-treatment principles
apply to the usage of technical regulations. By providing that all imported like products receive
the same treatment, Article 2.1 also invokes the application of most favored nation treatment to
technical regulations. The language rendering technical regulations subject to high levels of
scrutiny is the wording that members "shall ensure" the national treatment and MFN status of
imported products. Id.
104. General Interpretative Note to Annex 1A, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.
org/englishlres e/booksp.e/analyticindexe/wto agree 04 e.htm#general (last visited Sept. 18,
2012) ("In the event of conflict between a provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994 and a provision of another agreement in Annex 1A to the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization. . . the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent
of the conflict.").
105. Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing, and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 2, WTIDS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012)
[hereinafter United States-Tuna 11].
106. Id. 235.
107. Id. 196 ("To us, the mere fact that there is no requirement to use a particular label in
order to place a product for sale on the market does not preclude a finding that a measure
constitutes a 'technical regulation' within the meaning of Annex 1.1.").
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subjects labeling systems to the highest levels of scrutiny under the
TBT. 108 Both the Tuna-Dolphin I Panel and the Appellate Body
determined that the dolphin-safe label was "mandatory" within the
meaning of the TBT, even though the program did not require tuna
products be labeled "dolphin-safe" to be sold on the U.S. market. 10 9 At
the Appellate Body level, this determination rested on findings that,
first, the measures are comprised of acts attributable to the U.S.
government and, second, the measures occupy the field of dolphin-safe
labeling for canned tuna on the U.S. market.110 The result of this
interpretation is a stark departure from the plain meaning of the word
"mandatory." Moreover, the "entire field" argument seems
disingenuous given that this "field" is so narrow that it did not, for
example, cover sustainability labeling or safe fishing practices for
canned fish but rather sought to cover only dolphin-safe labeling for
canned-tuna products on the U.S. market.111 If applied to a private
system, one may wonder whether such field occupation is not
redundant of the function of trademarked labels.
Second, with respect to the test for violations of Article 2.1, the
Appellate Body adopted a competition-based test to determine
compliance. This test asks whether the technical regulation "has a
detrimental impact on the competitive opportunities" for the products
at issue.112 The Appellate Body has pointedly announced that this test
does not focus on "the legitimate objectives and purposes" of the
measures.11 3 Rather, objectives and purposes should only be taken into
account "to the extent that they are relevant to the examination of
certain likeness criteria and are reflected in the products' competitive
108. See TBT, supra note 103, art. 2.1 (providing that "in respect of technical regulations,
products imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no less
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like products originating
in any other country" (emphasis added)); supra note 103 and accompanying text.
109. United States-Tuna II, supra note 105, 199.
110. Id.
111. Id. 193 ("[T]he US 'dolphin-safe' labelling provisions set out 'certain requirements
that must be complied with in order to make any claim relating to the manner in which the tuna
contained in [a) tuna product was caught, in relation to dolphins'. The US measure thus covers
the entire field of what "dolphin-safe" means in relation to tuna products in the United States.").
112. Id. 235.
113. Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of
Clove Cigarettes, 112, WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012) ("We disagree with the Panel that the
text and context of the TBT Agreement support an interpretation of the concept of 'likeness' in
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement that focuses on the legitimate objectives and purposes of the
technical regulation, rather than on the competitive relationship between and among the
products." (citation omitted)).
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relationship."'114 In effect, the test thus serves to exclude legislative
purpose from the analysis of national legislation. Applying this test to
the dolphin-safe tuna program, the Appellate Body found that "the
lack of access to the 'dolphin-safe' label of tuna products containing
tuna caught by setting on dolphins has a detrimental impact on the
competitive opportunities of Mexican tuna products in the US
market.115 Given that setting on dolphins tends to be unsafe for them,
the Appellate Body's reasoning arguably becomes tautological.11 6
Normatively, products that cannot comply with labeling requirements
should not have access to those labels. As such, the reasoning of this
case, if applied to any labeling system, seems to create a per se
violation of Article 2.1.
With regard to the third issue, the Appellate Body has
arguably confused its prior jurisprudence on judicial economy. In past
cases, the Appellate Body has chosen to "only address those claims
which must be addressed in order to resolve the matter in issue in the
dispute."11 7 In this case, however, the Appellate Body responded to the
Panel's attempt at judicial economy by observing that it was based on
the flawed assumption that TBT Article 2.1 and GATT Articles I and
III are "substantially the same."' 18 The Appellate Body wrote that "the
scope and content of these provisions is not the same," but declined to
elaborate.11 9 It also did not rule on the GATT claims. Even if a TBT
claim were successful, then, a future panel might choose to rule in the
alternative on GATT claims as well, making past jurisprudence on
GATT claims important to the analysis of a private environmental-
labeling system under WTO law.
114. Id. 156.
115. Id. 235.
116. The Appellate Body did not disagree that the practice of setting on dolphins is harmful
to them. Rather, its reasoning seemed to rely on the uneven nature of the application of the U.S.
prohibitions on setting on dolphins. Id. 241 (noting Mexico's argument that areas outside of the
Eastern Tropical Pacific ("ETP") were subject to "relaxed compliance standards" because tuna
caught outside of the ETP did not need to be verified for having not employed the method of
setting on dolphins). The United States presented evidence that the practice of setting on
dolphins was not widely practiced outside of the ETP, and further argued that it lacked the
resources to certify that tuna were not harvested by setting on dolphins everywhere in the world.
BRENDAN MCGIVERN, WHITE & CASE, WTO APPELLATE BODY REPORT: UNITED STATES-TUNA 11,
at 2 (2012), available at http://www.whitecase.com/articles-05312012/. The Appellate Body did
not accept this argument. Id.
117. Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts
and Blouses from India, 19, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997).
118. United States-Tuna II, supra note 105, 405.
119. Id.
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With regard to GATT claims relating to certification and
labeling programs, WTO jurisprudence distinguishes between systems
with criteria based on physical characteristics and those based on
process and production methods ("PPMs"). 120 Many environmental-
labeling systems employ PPM criteria, such as whether timber was
sourced using sustainable logging activities or whether shrimp were
harvested with trawlers that tend not to kill sea turtles. Historically,
the WTO has strongly disfavored PPM-based systems.
An earlier iteration of the labeling dispute between the United
States and Mexico over dolphin-safe tuna set out the most widely
discussed articulation of the WTO's PPM-related concerns. 121 At the
center of that case were federal regulations issued pursuant to the
Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"), which sought to restrict
imports of tuna harvested using methods that tended to result in
higher dolphin kill rates. 122 The United States argued that because
the MMPA applied to both domestic and imported tuna, the
challenged regulations were "internal regulations" governed by-and
acceptable under-the GATT Article III provisions on national
treatment. 23 The Panel disagreed with the U.S. argument, however,
holding that regulations governing dolphins killed incidentally to the
harvesting of tuna "could not possibly affect tuna as a product.' 2 4
Because import restrictions on tuna caught using certain processes did
not regulate the "products as such," they could not constitute internal
product regulations and were thus discriminatory.125 By excluding
process-based distinctions from the "likeness" analysis, the Panel
effectively rendered all process-based systems per se violations of the
120. For an example of the argument regarding trade concerns on PPM characteristics, see
John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1243 (1992) (noting the concern that "if a nation is allowed to use [a]
process characteristic as the basis for trade-restrictive measures, then the result would be open
to a Pandora's box of problems that could open large loopholes in the GATT'"). Cf. Steve
Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
459, 493-98 (1994) (arguing that PPM measures are both legal and serve practical uses;
providing a history of environmentally motivated trade measures based on PPM measures).
121. Kysar, supra note 5, at 540-41.
122. Under the MMPA, U.S. federal regulations required foreign fish processors to obtain
U.S. certification that their tuna-harvesting methods resulted in a dolphin kill rate "comparable"
to that of the U.S. tuna industry in order to export to the United States. Tuna exports lacking
such a certification were banned. Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
DS21JR (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin 1].
123. John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and the
Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 6 (2004).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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GATT Article XI prohibition on import quotas, since they effectively
functioned as quotas of zero. 126 PPM issues have proved highly
contentious.127 Although there is a robust literature highlighting the
many circumstances under which PPM distinctions should be
legitimate, as of this writing, the WTO appears to maintain its
distinctive distaste for PPM-based certification and labeling
systems. 28
In theory, PPM-based certification and labeling systems may
be eligible for exception from liability under GATT Article XX. The
circumstances under which exception may be possible are identified in
the Shrimp-Turtle cases. These disputes related to U.S. trade
restrictions designed to protect endangered sea turtle species that
could be harmed by certain methods for harvesting shrimp.129
Pursuant to the Endangered Species Act, the U.S. Department of
State issued guidelines requiring countries to obtain national
certification of their shrimp-harvesting systems in order to export to
the United States. 30 Uncertified shrimp imports were prohibited.13'
Like the Tuna-Dolphin I Panel, this Panel found that the U.S.
measures violated Article XI's prohibition on import quotas, and the
Appellate Body upheld the ruling. 132 In so doing, it also set out a two-
part test for determining whether a measure falls within the scope of
GATT Article XX, known as the General Exceptions clause. First,
"provisional justification by reason of characterization of the measure"
126. Kysar, supra note 5, at 547.
127. At base, the question often comes down to: Does a consumer have a right to know the
provenance of her goods? The PPM debate can thus often seem unintuitive, as the WTO's answer
seems to have been a resounding "no." See also MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 11, at 808-11
(presenting both sides of the PPM debate).
128. See Kysar, supra note 5 (providing a lengthy set of citations regarding process-based
systems and their acceptability).
129. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle II]; Panel Report,
United States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTJDS58/R (May
15, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle I].
130. Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 129, 14-26.
131. Id.
132. Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 129, 187-88. Both the Panel's ruling and the Appellate
Body's ruling were highly controversial. Many argued that the opinions offered resounding proof
that the WTO was strongly anti-environment, arguments of which the Appellate Body were not
unaware. See, e.g., id. 185 ("[W]e wish to underscore what we have not decided in this appeal.
We have not decided that the protection and preservation of the environment is of no significance
to the Members of the WTO. Clearly, it is. We have not decided that the sovereign nations that
are Members of the WTO cannot adopt effective measures to protect endangered species, such as
sea turtles. Clearly, they can and should.").
2012] 1423
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
under one of the enumerated exceptions of Article XX is required. 133
Enumerated measures include those "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health" and those "relating to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources," among others.134 Second, the
responding member must demonstrate "further appraisal of the same
measure under the introductory clauses of Article XX."' 35 The meaning
of this verbiage is not entirely clear. Thus far, the WTO has read
Article XX narrowly in the context of environmental issues.' 36
This Section has explored how the WTO has regulated some of
the public regulators of environmental behavior. Government-
administered environmental-certification and environmental-labeling
systems have proved vulnerable to trade challenges under both the
TBT and the GATT. For this reason, in addition to those discussed in
Part II.C, one may wonder whether private environmental-
certification and environmental-labeling systems could replace
government systems to become one of the more active and effective
regulators of global environmental behavior. The next Section
analyzes when the WTO may attempt to regulate the private
regulators.
B. Object of the Dispute
This Section describes the WTO's jurisdictional analysis with
respect to the object of a dispute. It begins with a description of the
rules by which the WTO may take jurisdiction over the object of a
dispute and analyzes the cases in which the WTO has applied these
rules to disputes involving private parties. It closes with a proposal of
133. Id. 118.
134. GATT, supra note 17, at art. XX(b), XX(g).
135. Shrimp-Turtle 11, supra note 129, 187-88.
136. The WTO itself would not agree with this assessment. One of the reports it cites most
frequently when striking down measures aimed at protecting the environment provides what
appears to be strong advocacy for environmental measures. See Appellate Body Report, United
States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 29-30, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 22,
1996) ("WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own policies on the
environment (including its relationship with trade), their environmental objectives and the
environmental legislation they enact and implement. So far as concerns the WTO, that autonomy
is circumscribed only by the need to respect the requirements of the General Agreement and the
other covered agreements."); cf. Sanford Gaines, The WTO's Reading of the GATT Article XX
Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 739,
743-44 (2001) (discussing the extent to which Article XX does not provide an effective exception
for environmental measures); David A. Wirth, International Trade Agreements: Vehicles for
Regulatory Reform?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 331, 336 (noting that Article XX paragraphs (b) and
(g) have been "interpreted rather restrictively").
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a four-factor test by which to anticipate a claim of jurisdiction over the
activities of a private certification and labeling system.
1. Members Only
The WTO's dispute-settlement system is only available to
members. 13 7 As such, only WTO members may be the object of a
dispute. Unlike the theoretically infinite number of potentially valid
bases of a dispute, the number of potentially valid objects of a dispute
is limited to one or a group of the 157 members of the WTO. Precisely
when countries become objects of a dispute is a question answered by
the DSU, under which members must "identify the specific measures"
about which they are complaining when requesting adjudication.1 38
Under public international law and WTO practice, a "measure" is "any
act or omission attributable to a WTO member."' 39 A member thus
becomes an object of a dispute when the "act or omission"--that is, the
basis of the dispute-is "attributable" to it. 14 °
WTO members are, of course, countries.' 4 ' To determine which
activities are attributable to countries, the WTO again applies
traditional public international law, under which the activities of all
levels and all branches of a country's government are attributable to
it.142 Although one may like the analysis to stop there, it does not.
137. See e.g., Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 129, 101 ("[Ajccess to the dispute settlement
process of the WTO is limited to Members of the WTO. This access is not available, under the
WTO Agreement and the covered agreements as they currently exist, to individuals or
international organizations, whether governmental or non-governmental. Only Members may
become parties to a dispute of which a panel may be seized ..
138. DSU, supra note 25, at art. 6.2.
139. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties
on Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Japan, 81, WT/DS244/ABR (Dec. 15,
2003) ("[Amny act or omission attributable to a WTO Member can be a measure of that Member
for purposes of dispute settlement proceedings.").
140. Yanovich & Voon, supra note 97, at 119.
141. Customs territories and areas whose sovereignty are disputed may also be members of
the WTO. Hong Kong and Macau are both WTO members, yet they are part of the People's
Republic of China. Taiwan's sovereign status is unclear, yet "Chinese Taipei" is also a member.
WORLD TRADE ORG., Understanding the WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatise/tif.e/org6_e.htm (ast visited Sept. 18, 2012) (listing WTO members).
142. See, e.g., WORLD TRADE ORG., supra note 89 ("Under traditional public international
law, subjects of international law, typically States, are responsible for the activities of all
branches of government within their system of governance, and also for all regional levels or
other subdivisions of government."). The most prominent statement of this interpretation may be
traced to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2
Y.B. Intl L. Comm'n 31, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1. See also Joost Pauwelyn, The Role
of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535, 563 (2001)
("In their examination of WTO claims, [the panels and Appellate Body] have applied general
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2. To Attribute or Not to Attribute
Past cases demonstrate that private conduct may also be
justiciable by the WTO. The Panel Report in Japan-Film is frequently
cited for its articulation of the test under which the activities of a
private party may be attributed to a WTO member. In that case, the
Panel considered whether a code of conduct created by a private
retailers council was attributable to Japan and found in the
affirmative. 143 Writing that its inquiry was led by a "focus on the
status its actions are given in the eyes of the Japanese Government
and the.., industry," it concluded that a government agency's
approval of the code rendered the code attributable to Japan.144 That
approval helped create "a sufficient likelihood" that private parties
would conform with the code as though it were a legally binding
governmental measure. 45 The Panel declined to delineate a precise
rubric for a finding of "sufficient government involvement," writing
only that "[i]t is difficult to establish bright-line rules in this regard"
and that the "possibility will need to be examined on a case-by-case
basis." 46 Cases both before and since Japan-Film have presented the
GATT/WTO with a handful of occasions on which to consider when
private conduct has sufficient government involvement such that it is
attributable to a WTO member. Together, these examples may help to
provide some principles by which to consider future applications of the
sufficient-government-involvement analysis.
The first occasion on which the WTO's predecessor, the GATT,
considered whether private conduct was attributable to a government
came in a 1960 Panel's Review Pursuant to Article XVI:5 of the GATT.
Under Article XVI, a contracting party was required to provide
notification in the event that it granted or maintained a subsidy.147
One issue in the Review was whether subsidies financed by
nongovernmental levies were notifiable under Article XVI.148 By
implication, then, the issue was whether nongovernmental levies could
rules of international law, in particular on . . . state responsibility (such as . . . attribution),
referring each time to the work of the ILC on the subject.").
143. Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper,
10.56, WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31, 1998) [hereinafter Japan-Film].
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. GATT, supra note 17, at art. XVI.
148. Panel Report, Review Pursuant to Article XVI5, L/1160 (May 24, 1960), GATT B.I.S.D.
(9th Supp.) at 188 (1961) [hereinafter 1960 Review].
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be attributable to GATT contracting parties. On the one hand, the
Panel found "no obligation to notify schemes in which a group of
producers voluntarily taxed themselves in order to subsidize the exports
of a product."'149 On the other, it felt that parties had an obligation to
notify all schemes "in which the government took a part either by
making payments into the common fund or by entrusting to a private
party the functions of taxation and subsidization.' ' 50 The Panel
determined that the question of whether to notify is informed by "the
source of the funds and the extent of government action, if any, in their
collection."' 51 The Panel declined to formulate "a precisely worded
recommendation designed to cover all contingencies," but stated that
governments should "notify all levy/subsidy schemes.., which are
dependent for their enforcement on some form of government action."'
52
The resonance of the Review's analysis should not be considered less
relevant because of its age. Indeed, its entire discussion of
nongovernmental levies has been included as an interpretive gloss in
the WTO's Analytical Index of the GATT, and the Panel in Japan-Film
relied principally on it in setting out its sufficient-government-
involvement test.153
Another occasion on which the GATT considered whether
private conduct was attributable to a government was an adjudicative
decision. The issue in EEC-Apples related to a complex system of
import licensing and other regulations designed to limit the amount of
apples on the European market.' 54 One element of this system
permitted nongovernmental producer groups to withdraw apples from
the European market under certain circumstances. 55 Europe argued
that this system of withdrawals could not constitute a governmental
measure because it was carried out by nongovernmental entities on a
voluntary basis.156 After citing the reasoning of the 1960 Review, the
149. Id. 12.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Like adopted reports themselves, the discussions cited in the Index are not binding on
future panels or the Appellate Body, but they are selected for inclusion on the basis that they both
clarify and inform the DSM's interpretive approach to the covered agreements. See Japan-Alcoholic
Beverages, supra note 45 (discussing the relevance of GATT reports to WTO panel and Appellate
Body interpretations).
154. See Panel Report, European Economic Communities-Restrictions on Imports of Dessert
Apples-Complaint by Chile, L/6491 (June 22, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 93 (1989)
[hereinafter EEC-Apples].
155. Id. 2.1.
156. Id. 3.11.
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Panel held that the withdrawal system was "governmental. '" 1 57 The
Panel recognized that the overall system "combined elements of public
and private responsibility," but explained that the system as a whole
was nonetheless attributable to the government because it had: (1) been
established by government, (2) depended on government financing for
its operations, and (3) carried out its operations in ways prescribed by
regulation.'5 8
At least three WTO cases since Japan-Film have addressed the
issue of when private conduct becomes subject to WTO law. In Canada-
Dairy, the Appellate Body affirmed the Panel's finding that the
activities of several provincial marketing boards comprised of private-
sector producers were attributable to Canada on two grounds. 159 First,
the "source" of the boards' "powers" was deemed governmental because
they acted in a capacity that was created and delegated to them by the
federal and regional governments of Canada. 160 On appeal, Canada
argued that a private entity's conduct could not be attributable to the
government on the sole basis of the delegation of authority. 161 Although
the Appellate Body did not explicitly agree with this contention, it
emphasized that the Panel's finding rested not only on the boards'
sources of powers but also on the "functions" they performed. 162 On this
issue, the Appellate Body provided an extended discussion of the
character of governmental functions. It began by analyzing dictionary
definitions, finding that governmental functions include "regulation,
restraint, supervision, or control."'163 With respect to the boards at
issue, the Appellate Body highlighted their regulatory and advocacy
functions. The boards' regulatory activities included their issuance
and administration of quotas, pooling of returns, pricing activities,
record keeping, inspection activities, and maintenance of agreements
that permitted them to cooperate with other provincial marketing
boards. 64 The Appellate Body further noted that the stated mission of
157. Id.
158. Id. 12.9.
159. Panel Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation
of Dairy Products, WT/DS103/AB[R, WT/DS113/AB/R (Oct. 13, 1999) [hereinafter Canada-
Dairy].
160. Id. 98.
161. Id. 100.
162. Id.
163. Id. 97; see also Japan-Film, supra note 143, 10.376 (stating that the words "laws,
regulations and requirements" in GATT Article I1I:4 "should be interpreted as encompassing a
broad range of government action and action by private parties that may be assimilated to
government action").
164. Id. 99.
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these boards was to promote the interests of the dairy sector and
determined this to be a governmental function as well. 'In our view,"
the Appellate Body wrote, "it is part of the normal function of
'governments' to promote the perceived interests of the State, and this
may involve securing the interests of one or more sectors of the
community."165
Two additional cases--determined within weeks of each
other-have grappled with the issue of WTO jurisdiction over private
conduct in the context of activities involving elements of both
government conduct and private choice. In Korea-Beef, the measure at
issue was a scheme instituted by the central Korean government
whereby retailers had to choose to sell either domestic or imported
beef exclusively. 166 Many retailers chose to sell domestic beef, and thus
had to stop selling imported beef.167 Arguing that the reductions in
retail sales of imported beef were not attributable to the government,
Korea pointed to the fact that the situation was ultimately the product
of private choice. 168 The Appellate Body disagreed, arguing that "the
intervention of some element of private choice does not relieve Korea
of responsibility" for creating competitive conditions in which
imported goods are treated in no less favorable a manner than
domestic goods. 169
In Argentina-Hides and Leather, by contrast, the Panel found
government authorization of a private-industry association's
participation in customs-control procedures insufficient for attributing
its conduct to Argentina. 170 Europe argued that the association's
members effectively intimidated domestic producers from exporting
raw hides to the extent of creating an export restriction in violation of
GATT Article XI:1.171  Citing Japan-Film and the "sufficient
government involvement" language, the Panel wrote that members
165. Id. 101.
166. Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen
Beef, 146, WT/DS161/ABIR, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea-Bee].
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.; see also Rex J. Zedalis, When Do the Activities of Private Parties Trigger WTO
Rules?, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 335, 340-44 (2007) (discussing two GATT reports that have also
grappled with the relationship between governmental conduct and private choice). As these cases
do not involve private conduct as the initiating activity, they are not relevant to the framework
developed here.
170. Panel Report, Argentina-Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import
of Finished Leather, 11.22, WT/DS155JR (Dec. 19, 2000) [hereinafter Argentina-Hides and
Leather].
171. Id. 4.5-4.6.
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are not "under an obligation to exclude any possibility that
governmental measures may enable private parties, directly or
indirectly, to restrict trade, where those measures themselves are not
trade-restrictive. '" 172  The private-industry association's "mere
presence" at customs-controls points was insufficient grounds for
concluding that the association's actions were attributable to
Argentina.173
3. When to Attribute: A Framework for Anticipating a Jurisdictional
Claim
Taken together, these cases suggest that one framework for
anticipating a WTO claim of jurisdiction over the conduct of a private
certification and labeling system takes into account the organization's:
(1) source of authority, (2) source of funds, (3) functions, and (4)
enforcement systems. This Section addresses each issue in turn.
If a private organization's authority either derives or appears to
derive from a governmental source, its actions may be attributable to a
WTO member. Under Canada-Dairy, the activities of a body composed
of private citizens were governmental in part because that body acted
under "authority delegated to them" by the Canadian government. 174
Moreover, the language in the 1960 Review Pursuant to Article XVI:5
regarding a government's "entrusting" of certain functions to a private
body also suggests that the original source of the body's mission or
authority may be relevant to the inquiry. 175 The Japan-Film case
suggests that the WTO may also analyze "authority" on subjective
grounds. Indeed, that Panel's inquiry was led by a "focus on the status
[the private body's] actions are given in the eyes of the...
Government and the.., industry."176 Some element of private choice
does not relieve a government of responsibility for private conduct, but
under Japan-Film and Argentina-Hides and Leather, a "sufficient
172. Id. 11.18-11.19.
173. Id. 11.19 ("[W]e do not think that it follows from [the Japan-Film] panel's statement
or from the text or context of Article XI: 1 that Members are under an obligation to exclude any
possibility that governmental measures may enable private parties, directly or indirectly, to
restrict trade, where those measures themselves are not trade-restrictive.").
174. Canada-Dairy, supra note 159, 1 98.
175. 1960 Review, supra note 148, 12.
176. Japan-Film, supra note 143, 10.213.
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likelihood" that the private conduct will be viewed as governmental
does seem to be required.177
A private organization with sources of financing that include
government funds may find its activities attributable to a WTO
member. For example, the EEC-Apples Panel analyzed the private
organization's dependence on public financing when considering
whether its activities were "governmental."178 The Review's discussion
of private bodies' sources of funds encompassed both government
"payments into" private bodies and a somewhat more expansive "source
of funds" analysis.179  Indeed, one of the most powerful tools
governments have to influence private conduct is their substantial
purchasing power.'80 However, procurement policies that support or
require certified products for government purchases are unlikely to play
a prominent role in a sufficient-government-involvement analysis,
because they are not reviewable at all under any of the binding WTO
agreements.181 The WTO reviews government procurement under the
Government Procurement Agreement ("GPA"), which is one of the
aforementioned Annex 4 plurilateral agreements to which parties must
separately consent.18 2 To date, few members have consented to the
GPA.183
If a private organization's functions are deemed to be
governmental, its activities in carrying out these functions may be
attributable to a WTO member. The WTO arguably takes an
expansive view of functions that may be governmental. Under both
the Review and Canada-Dairy, the imposition of taxes, levies, or fees
177. Id.; see Argentina-Hides and Leather, supra note 170, 11.22 (discussing the
insufficiency of"mere presence").
178. EEC-Apples, supra note 154, 3.11.
179. 1960 Review, supra note 148, 12.
180. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Linking International Markets and Global Justice, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 1039, 1039 (2009) ("The U.S. government is the planet's largest purchaser of goods and
services; worldwide, states spend trillions of dollars on procurement each year.").
181. For present purposes, only GATT Article III (addressing national treatment) and the
TBT are relevant. See GATT, supra note 17, at art. III:8(a) ("The provisions of this Article shall
not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental
agencies of products purposes for governmental purchases .... "); TBT, supra note 103, at art. 1.4
("Purchasing specifications prepared by governmental bodies for production or consumption
requirements of governmental bodies are not subject to the provisions of this agreement but are
addressed in the Agreement on Government Procurement.. .
182. See supra Part II.A.2.
183. For a current list of Members who have become Parties to the GPA, see Parties and
Observers to the GPA, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/gproc
_e/memobs-e.htm#parties.
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are governmental activities. 8 4 Likewise, the distribution of funds
pooled by such taxes, levies, or fees may also be governmental.18 5
Under Canada-Dairy, "regulation," "restraint," "supervision," and
"control" are also governmental functions, as is promoting "the
perceived interests of the State, and ... securing the interests of one
or more sectors of the community."'18 6
Finally, and perhaps most intuitively, the extent of government
involvement in carrying out an organization's functions is likely to
inform a panel considering whether to exercise jurisdiction over
private conduct. The Review made particular note of government
assistance in "enforcement" of the private system at issue.18 7 Likewise,
the Panel in EEC-Apples and the Appellate Body in Canada-Dairy
both suggested that the private bodies' regulatory activities were
enforceable by government entities. 88
The WTO has thus found numerous violations by
environmental-certification and environmental-labeling systems, and
some of these findings have rested on highly fact-specific or otherwise
unpredictable grounds. In five out of six disputes involving private
conduct, the WTO determined that it can attribute private conduct to
WTO members and thereby regulate those activities. As discussed in
Part II, environmental-certification and environmental-labeling
systems may be thought of as actors in a growing global network of
private environmental governance.' 8 9 Whether normatively or by
default, these actors have served a gap-filling purpose in the face of an
ongoing absence of public environmental governance. If the WTO
claims jurisdiction over an institution of private environmental
governance, it may restrict the gap-filling functions that they serve.
The next Part considers whether public law will seek to regulate these
private regulators.
IV. A LABEL BY ANY OTHER LABEL: APPLYING THE ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK
If a dispute involving the activities of a private environmental-
labeling system were to come before the WTO, it would likely take the
184. Canada-Dairy, supra note 159, 11, 101; 1960 Review, supra note 148, 12.
185. 1960 Review, supra note 148, 12.
186. Id. 97.
187. Id. 12.
188. Id.
189. See supra Part I.C.
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following form. The complaining member would be an exporting
country from the developing world. The responding member would be
an importing country from the developed world. Because of the
compulsory nature of the WTO's jurisdiction, the responding member
would not be able to avoid adjudication in the event of a claim of
jurisdiction. Because of its exclusive nature, the issue would not have
been tested in another international forum, and finally, because of the
contentious nature of WTO jurisdiction, the parties would not be able
to anticipate how the WTO would rule in advance of the issuance of
the binding ruling.
A. Basis of the Dispute
The basis of such a dispute would take the form of a violation
complaint under at least the TBT and the GATT. The WTO would
consider the TBT claims first.190
The TBT claims would invoke Articles 2, 4, and 3. Under TBT
Article 2, members are required to "ensure" that mandatory systems
of technical regulations prepared, adopted, and applied by central
government bodies conform with MFN and national-treatment
principles.191 Article 4 sets out a lower standard for governments'
voluntary standards systems, requiring only that members take
"reasonable measures" to ensure MFN and national-treatment
standards are met.192 Article 3 requires that members take
"reasonable measures" to ensure that nongovernmental bodies that
prepare, adopt, and apply mandatory systems of technical regulations
also comply with MFN and national treatment principles. 193 It also
requires that members both refrain from taking measures which
"require or encourage" nongovernmental bodies to act inconsistently
with Article 2 and affirmatively "formulate and implement positive
measures... in support of the observance of the provisions of Article
2" by nongovernmental bodies.194 No claim in the history of the WTO
has cited Article 4, and no panel has yet ruled on an Article 3 claim. 195
190. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
191. TBT, supra note 103, at art. 2.1.
192. Id. at art. 2.4.
193. Id. at art. 3.
194. Id.
195. Of the forty-five TBT claims that have been filed since 1995, only two have cited Article
3. One of these was settled without adjudication. The other, filed in 1998, appears to be stalled.
See Request for Consultations from Canada, United States-Certain Measures Affecting the
Import of Cattle, Swine and Grain from Canada, WT/DS144/1 (Sept. 29, 1998); see also United
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Given that the most stringent requirements for MFN and
national treatment are under Article 2, and especially given the recent
decision that a nonobligatory labeling system was nonetheless
"mandatory," the complaining member may argue that there is
sufficient government involvement with the activities of the private
organization such that its activities are directly subject to Article 2.
The responding member would have no opportunity for exception from
liability, as the TBT contains no environmental exception analogous to
GATT Article XX. If a TBT claim were successful, the WTO might
exercise judicial economy and refrain from ruling on the GATT claims,
but it might not.196 In the event of the latter, the GATT general
exceptions clause would come into play, and the responding member
could seek exception from GATT liability.
The WTO may consider GATT claims under Articles I, III, and
XI. It would likely apply its stringent PPM analysis under which
labeling systems that distinguish products on the basis of process and
production methods are reviewed under Article XI rather than Article
III. Under Article XI, a complaining member may argue that the PPM-
based system functioned as a de facto import quota.1 97 Under Article I,
the member may allege that the system functions as a de facto system
that discriminates between imports on the basis of national origin. 198
The complaining member may also allege that the less stringent
requirements of Article III are inapplicable because PPM measures
are inherently discriminatory. The responding member would seek
exception for the system's activities under Article XX, but as discussed
above, panels and the Appellate Body have read this exception
narrowly.199
The basis of the dispute would thus likely be broad.
Considering past cases involving governmental systems, if the object
States-Certain Measures Affecting the Import of Cattle, Swine and Grain from Canada, WORLD
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/englishtratop e/dispue/cases_e/ds144_e.htm (July 24, 2012)
(describing the dispute as "in consultations"). For a list of all claims made under the TBT, see
Disputes by Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispue/dispu-
agreements index e.htm?id=A22#selected-agreement (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
196. See Panel Report, United States-Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing, and
Sale of Tuna and Tna Products, 7.747-7.748, WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011) (noting that past
WTO practice has been to exercise judicial economy when declining to rule on Mexico's GATT
claims); cf. supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing WTO's finding of false judicial
economy in United States-Tna 11).
197. GATT, supra note 17, at art. XI:1.
198. Id. at art. I.
199. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
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of the dispute were valid, the complaining member may have a strong
case.
B. Object of the Dispute: The Case Studies
The object of a dispute regarding a private environmental-
labeling system would, of course, be a WTO member. The following
case studies apply the framework set out in Part III.B.2 to three
prominent private labeling organizations in order to determine the
circumstances under which their activities might be found
attributable to a member, thereby creating a valid object for this
dispute.
1. Forest Stewardship Council
The Forest Stewardship Council ("FSC") is an NGO whose
mission is to promote responsible management of the world's forests.
To this end, the FSC offers a voluntary certification and labeling
program for forest products from sustainably harvested and verified
sources. As of August 2012, it has certified over 164 million hectares of
forest lands in eighty-one countries. 200 If sued, the WTO might claim
jurisdiction over the FSC's certification and labeling system on the
basis that the European Union is sufficiently involved with the FSC's
activities.
The FSC's source of authority is distinctly nongovernmental.
Indeed, it was established shortly following international efforts to
create a binding international forestry convention failed.201 Industry
actors seeking to distinguish their products cooperated with NGOs to
create the FSC in 1993.202 Its highest decisionmaking body is the
General Assembly of FSC members. 20 3 FSC members include NGOs,
indigenous peoples' associations, unions, academic institutions,
industry associations, certification bodies, and individuals. 20 4 It is
governed by a board of directors comprised of nine individuals, none of
200. See FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.fsc.org/ (providing current facts and
figures regarding certification on homepage).
201. CERTIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 30.
202. Id.
203. See Governance, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.fsc.org/governance.14.htm
(last visited Aug. 26, 2012).
204. Id.
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whom is directly affiliated with a government. 20 5 The FSC operates in
more than fifty countries. 20 6
Multiple governmental sources have provided funding for the
FSC using several methods. First, governments have sought FSC
certification themselves, and all parties seeking certification must pay
fees to the FSC to do So.20 7 This is a common practice in some eastern
European countries with large state-owned forests, including Estonia,
Latvia, and Poland.208 Governments have also provided funding to the
FSC through donations. Interestingly, during the mid-1990s, Austria
was among a group of countries, states, and cities that banned imports
of ecologically unsound timber.20 9 Its ban was challenged as a trade
barrier.210 Austria rescinded the ban but directed that government
funds previously allocated for the ban's implementation be paid
directly to the FSC itself.2" I  In response to public pressure,
Switzerland and the Netherlands have also provided financial support
to the FSC.212
A number of countries, particularly in Europe, have
incorporated FSC standards into their procurement policies. 213 This
practice provides significant financial support to the organization, but
a procurement policy alone is probably beyond the scope of the WTO's
analysis for purposes of GATT or TBT claims. 214 However, a
complaining party could argue that procurement policies are
analogous to nonbinding guidance. To the extent that governments
openly communicate their procurement policies, they could be viewed
as contributing to a "sufficient likelihood" that other private parties
would emulate government purchasing practices. As seen in Korea-
Beef, some element of private choice does not cut off the governmental
205. Id.
206. FSC Canada Appoints Francois Dufresne as its New President, FOREST STEWARDSHIP
COUNCIL (May 7, 2012), http://www.fsc.org/national-news.328.39.htm.
207. Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The Case
of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 47, 59 (2006).
208. BENJAMIN CASHORE, GRAEME AULD & DEANNA NEWSOM, GOVERNMENT THROUGH
MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE AUTHORITY 8 (2006). The
U.S. state of Pennsylvania has also been quite active with FSC certification; over two million
acres of publicly owned forests are FSC-certified. CERTIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 30.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 93-94.
214. See supra Part III.B.2.
1436 [Vol. 65:5:1401
WARNING: MAY CAUSE WARMING
nature of otherwise public conduct. 215 That said, this argument seems
fairly tenuous and unlikely to succeed.
The WTO may also find some of the FSC's functions to be
governmental. The chief criterion for FSC certification is compliance
with all applicable laws.216 The rationale for this criterion is based on
the practical reality that in some countries as much as eighty percent
of timber is harvested illegally, often in violation of local laws
protecting forests or indigenous communities. 217 Monitoring legality
could be framed as a regulatory or supervisory function, which, in
turn, is a governmental function. In the alternative, monitoring
legality sometimes serves the purpose of protecting indigenous
communities, and "securing the interests of one or more sectors of the
community" may also be a governmental function.218 However, like
many private certification and labeling systems, the FSC does not
monitor compliance or issue certificates itself. It accredits independent
organizations, which then have the authority to determine compliance
and make certification decisions. 219 This structure may complicate the
WTO's analysis on the issue, but the fact that the FSC still functions
to support the monitoring of legality likely renders at least some of its
functions "governmental," and a number of these functions are carried
out in Europe.
Although governments have not assisted in the enforcement of
FSC standards, accredited FSC-certification bodies assist
governments in the monitoring of compliance with their own
measures. 220  When Bolivia passed a requirement that forest
concessionaries meet certain sustainability standards, for example,
215. Korea-Beef, supra note 166.
216. See Mission & Vision: Protecting Forests for Future Generations, FOREST STEWARDSHIP
COUNCIL, http://us.fsc.orglmission-and-vision.187.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (Principle 1 of
the FSC Principles and Criteria requires forest managers to comply with all applicable laws and
international treaties.).
217. Id.
218. Canada-Dairy, supra note 159, 97.
219. Accreditation Program, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.fsc.org/
accreditation.28.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2012).
220. Government policies adopted in the United States and European Union aimed at
addressing the import of illegal forest products have indirectly promoted forest-certification
programs such as the FSC's. CERTIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 31-32. The Lacey Act in
the United States and the Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade Initiative in the
European Union both require that importers show they are not importing illegally harvested
wood. Id. Certification schemes that encompass chain-of-custody requirements to verify the
source of imported products have emerged as an effective way to demonstrate this due diligence.
Id.
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the FSC was the only certification body that met those standards.221 It
became the de facto auditor for Bolivia while the government worked
toward developing its own auditing scheme. 222 Evidently enough, the
FSC's involvement with Bolivia would not be directly applicable to a
government-involvement analysis if the responding member were the
European Union. However, European governments may wish to avoid
working with the FSC in the certification of their forest products for
compliance with various levels of European law in order to avoid
further government involvement with the FSC from an enforcement
perspective.
Finally, the effective operation of the FSC-standards system
may be viewed as discriminatory against some foreign products. Given
the importance of legality to FSC certification, local regulatory
conditions have, in practice, affected whether forest managers can
become certified. In Indonesia, for example, the state owns all forest
lands.223 Although recent policies recognize traditional and customary
rights, the Indonesian government does not appear to have clearly
enforced them.224 High levels of illegal activity and local government
complicity in these activities appear to persist.225 Although Indonesia
has developed its own certification system and joined it with that of
the FSC, few Indonesian forests have been certified. 226
In sum, the FSC has nongovernmental authority, but it often
serves to support governmental authorities. Some of its funds are
governmental, but these have diminished significantly since the
1990s. And funds analyses are unlikely to form part of the attribution
analysis. Although the FSC has some regulatory, supervisory, and
advocacy functions, it does not directly carry out the activities that
serve these functions. Moreover, unlike the Canadian marketing
boards in the Canada-Dairy case, for example, the FSC does not serve
the governmental functions of only one government. Rather, it serves
these functions for each of the eighty-one countries in which it certifies
forests. FSC activities may be vulnerable to challenge in the WTO, but
such a suit would likely be complicated due to the large geographic
scope of its activities. Given that many developing countries use FSC
221. Id. at 33.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 31.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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standards and certification, the international community may exert
significant pressure on members to refrain from filing a complaint.
2. Marine Stewardship Council
The Marine Stewardship Council ("MSC") is an independent
nonprofit organization that administers a prominent certification and
labeling program with the goal of promoting sustainable fishing
practices. At least two dozen of the world's largest MNCs in the retail
food sector use the MSC logo, including Wal-Mart in the United States
and Sainsbury's in the United Kingdom. 227 Its label appears on more
than ten thousand products worldwide, representing a total retail
value of $2.2 billion.228 Almost seven percent of global wild landings of
fish for human consumption are MSC certified.229 In the United
States, the MSC has certified or is in the process of certifying sixty
percent of fishery landings.230 Despite its size, if sued, the WTO would
probably not claim jurisdiction over the MSC's activities.
Like the FSC, the MSC was established in the mid-1990s
through cooperative efforts of NGOs and MNCs, making its original
grant of authority and ongoing powers distinctly nongovernmental. 231
Its governance structure is typical of a nonprofit organization, being
led by a Board of Trustees and supported by several advisory boards
whose members have few governmental connections. 232 Over ninety
percent of the MSC's income is derived from charitable grants and
activities. 233 In its most recent fiscal year, less than five percent of the
MSC's funding came from government agencies directly. 234
Like any private certification and labeling system, however,
the MSC serves an arguably regulatory function. Like the FSC,
legality is a factor in its certification system, but MSC standards do
not emphasize legality to the same extent that FSC standards do.235
227. Vandenbergh, supra note 62, at 923.
228. CERTIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at A-75.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See id. at 12 (discussing how cooperative efforts between Unilever and Rainforest
Alliance eventually led to creation of the MSC in 1997).
232. See Structure, Governance, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.msc.org/about-
us/governance/structure/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2012) (describing governance structure).
233. Our Finances, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.msc.org/about-us/finances
(last visited Aug. 26, 2012).
234. Id.
235. MSC's overall standards scheme is publicly available. MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
MSC FISHERY STANDARD: PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FOR SUSTAINABLE FISHING (2010), available
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Rather, the MSC attempts to directly promote sustainable fishing
practices and minimize environmental impacts.236
Unlike how the FSC approaches monitoring, the MSC "relies
heavily on the effective implementation of government fisheries
regulations to ensure" that the public fisheries it certifies are
compliant with MSC standards. 237 It requires that fisheries be subject
to an effective "management system that respects local, national and
international laws and standards and incorporates institutional and
operational frameworks that require the use of the resource to be
responsible and sustainable."238 In most cases, this management
system is a government agency. 239 For example, the government of
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands owns and manages a
number of fisheries; it is also the direct holder of an MSC license for
Patagonian toothfish.240 As such, the MSC's enforcement systems may
be subject to the characterization that they are governmental.
Like the pattern of FSC-certified forests, the geographic
pattern of MSC-certified fisheries suggests that certification may be
more difficult for fisheries in countries with lax regulatory regimes. 241
This fact may tend to sway a panel in favor of a potential complainant
in the face of, for example, a TBT Article 2.1 claim.
Thus, the MSC has nongovernmental authority, and although
it has regulatory functions, these are not a close substitute for public
regulatory functions like the FSC standards are. Its source of funds is
by and large private, and its standards have not been incorporated
into any government's procurement policies. Like the FSC, the MSC
also works in many countries, complicating the question of the WTO
member at which a complaint might potentially be directed. The final
issue, then, would be the fact that the MSC relies on government
agencies to ensure parties comply with all local laws. Because
government agencies ensure compliance with laws as a matter of their
own functions and not simply to serve the MSC, this element of the
at http://www.msc.org/documents/scheme-documents/msc-standardsMSC-environmental-
standardfor sustainable-fishing.pdf.
236. See id. (setting out sustainability and the minimization of environmental impacts
before legality).
237. CERTIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 31.
238. MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, supra note 235, at 6.
239. CERTIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 31.
240. CHRISTINE CAREY & ELIZABETH GUTTENSTEIN, GOVERNMENTAL USE OF VOLUNTARY
STANDARDS: INNOVATION IN SUSTAINABILITY GOVERNANCE 18 (2008).
241. CERTIFICATION REPORT, supra note 2, at 31 (observing that more developed world
fisheries tend to become MSC-certified than their developing world counterparts and suggesting
that this may be related to the effectiveness of government management systems).
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MSC standards and certification system alone is unlikely to give rise
to a jurisdictional finding.
3. Blue Angel
The Blue Angel certification and labeling system is a voluntary
program that seeks to provide economic incentives to manufacturers
to develop products whose raw materials, production processes, and
product-use and product-disposal methods are less harmful to the
environment than conventional products. Blue Angel is the oldest
environmental-labeling system in the world and currently covers
11,500 products, produced by over one thousand companies, covering
ninety product categories. 242 Although relatively unknown in the
United States, it is prominent in Europe. The WTO probably would
exercise jurisdiction over this system on the basis of its involvement
with the European Union.
Blue Angel's source of authority is governmental. It was
established by the German government in 1978.243 Given the label's
prominence in Europe, it is possible that the system is self-sustaining
without additional public grants of financing, but data on the system's
finances do not appear to be available. Its stated functions include
promoting both environmental protection and consumer protection.244
Blue Angel's enforcement systems, however, are not purely
governmental. It is managed by four distinct entities, only two of
which are governmental. Agencies of the federal German government
own the label and set out the technical criteria to which products must
conform in order to gain access to the label. 245 But an independent
Environmental Label Jury, composed of representatives from firms,
industry associations, trade unions, and local authorities, grants
certification. 246 RAL gGmbH is a private body that awards the label. 247
Although the Blue Angel system does not hold itself out as a
government agency, the German government is probably sufficiently
involved in it that a complaining member would have a case against
the European Union for Blue Angel's activities. Like the regime in
242. The Blue Angel-Eco-Label With Brand Character, THE BLUE ANGEL, http://www.blauer-
engel.de/enlblauer-engellindex.php (last visited Aug. 26, 2012).
243. Id.
244. The Blue Angel-What's Behind It?, THE BLUE ANGEL, http://www.blauer-engel.de/eri
blauer enge]Iwhatsjbehindit/index.php (last visited Aug. 26, 2012).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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EEC-Apples, this regime has elements of both public and private
responsibility, but it operates pursuant to government mandate.
Given the recent decision on the dolphin-safe label for tuna, in which a
nonobligatory labeling system was deemed "mandatory" and thus
subject to TBT Article 2, Blue Angel may be particularly vulnerable to
claims under Article 2.
Each of these environmental-labeling systems thus exhibits
some form of government involvement. The source of authority for the
Blue Angel system is primarily governmental. The source of funds and
functions of the FSC are arguably governmental, and the enforcement
of the MSC system often seems governmental. The application of this
Note's four-part framework to these organizations-more than
predicting any specific outcome-suggests that the WTO may rule in
different ways depending on very specific circumstances of the
labeling system at issue.
C. The WTO Should Adopt a Narrow Jurisdictional Analysis
This prediction notwithstanding, the WTO should exercise
jurisdiction over private environmental-labeling systems under only
the narrowest of circumstances. This Section suggests one possible
approach incorporating the above-described framework before
discussing the three principal reasons why the WTO should regulate
narrowly.
One principled approach to the regulation of private
environmental-certification and environmental-labeling systems
would take into account government involvement at each stage of the
four-part framework and only exercise jurisdiction when all four parts
exhibit significant government involvement. First, a finding of private
sources of authority should be dispositive in favor of a finding of no
jurisdiction. Even if an organization had some government
involvement at its inception, the WTO's analysis should take into
account whether the organization's ongoing authority is
governmentally or privately derived. Second, the WTO's analysis of an
organization's financial position should ignore government
procurement policies entirely, as they are not reviewable under the
binding WTO agreements. 248 With regard to the third element of the
proposed framework, one option would be to consider whether the
function is one that the government would otherwise conduct.
Protecting the interests of certain communities or sectors should not
248. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the Annex 4 plurilateral agreements).
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be considered a governmental function because it encompasses far too
many nongovernmental activities. This should be the least important
factor in the analysis. Finally, the WTO's enforcement-related
analysis should focus on whether the government that is providing
assistance with enforcement would be taking such action if not for the
presence of the organization. If the government would otherwise be
enforcing the activity at issue, its enforcement should not be
considered involvement with private conduct.
The WTO should adopt a narrow application of the sufficient-
government-involvement analysis for at least three reasons. First, and
most practically, the WTO lacks both the expertise and the resources
to evaluate environmental measures. 249 The recent United States-
Thna II decision offers particularly compelling evidence in favor of a
conservative approach to jurisdictional claims. Although the DSU
empowers the panels and Appellate Body to engage outside experts,
both the Panel and Appellate Body in this case chose to forgo that
option.250 Neither provided any explanation for having done so,
leaving observers to wonder about the basis on which trade experts in
Geneva, Switzerland, could plausibly claim the competence to
evaluate U.S.-consumer protection and global dolphin welfare. 251
Given that environmental certification and labeling can be highly
technical-and bear little if any subject-matter relationship to
international trade-this approach seems inappropriate. The WTO
also lacks the resources to open its doors to a wider range of disputes
than it already hears. 252 Given the lack of expertise, lack of resources,
and what may be an organizational culture that minimizes the value
of nontrade-related expertise, the WTO should take a restrained view
of its jurisdictional reach over private environmental-certification and
environmental-labeling systems.
Second, the WTO is not accountable to the individuals and
organizations that have supported the growth of private
249. See, e.g., Marie Wilke & Hannes Schloemann, Not -So- Voluntary Labelling in the WTO
Tuna-Dolphin Dispute, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
(Nov. 2011), http://ictsd.org/inews/bioresreview/117757/ (noting that the United States-Tuna H
panel "clearly struggled with" the task it set out for itself of reviewing dolphin welfare and U.S.
consumer protection).
250. Id.; see also DSU, supra note 25, at art. 13.2 ("Panels may seek information from any
relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the
matter.').
251. Wilke & Schloemann, supra note 249.
252. See Andrew T. Guzman, Determining the Appropriate Standard of Review in WTO
Disputes, 42 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 45, 48-49 (2009) (describing the DSM's lack of resources to
review national policies).
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environmental governance. Its members are national governments,
and the WTO's decisionmaking bodies are far removed from private
citizens, firms, and NGOs. As these latter groups are the ones that
drive private environmental certification and labeling, the WTO
should maintain a restrained view of its jurisdictional reach over
environmental certification and labeling in order to address justice
concerns and heed its practical limitations.
Third, a claim of jurisdiction over a private environmental-
labeling system is at odds with the missions and purposes of the WTO.
Since its inception, the overarching mission of both the WTO and the
GATT before it has been trade liberalization. 253 Private labeling
systems are, by their very nature, market driven.254 The WTO exists
to support private markets, not to stymie their growth. Moreover, as
discussed above, the one addition that was made to the WTO
preamble to differentiate it from the original GATT is language
regarding sustainability and environmental protection. A responsible
reading of the documents creating the WTO and its dispute-settlement
bodies should not ignore this history. The WTO presides over a
globalized economy that has both externalized many environmental
harms associated with cross-border trade and undervalued the cost of
global commons resources. 255 It sits in a web of governance structures,
many of which are private. 256 Regardless of whether private
environmental governance is viewed as normatively desirable or
simply a matter of default, that existence remains, and it appears to
be growing.257 The WTO should recognize that it is not the only
regulator of cross-border behavior, that it cannot be the only regulator,
and that it should not be the only regulator, particularly of cross-
border environmental behavior.
The WTO's sufficient-government-involvement analysis has
great value because it allows the organization to evaluate when
ostensibly private organizations are nothing more than organs of the
state. In the United States, the lines between public and private may
often seem clear, but not every WTO member is like the United
States. In some developing countries, for example, the largest and
most powerful firms are owned by the state.258 The lines between
253. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 17, pmbl.
254. See supra Part I.C.
255. See supra Part I.B.
256. See supra Part JI.B.
257. See supra Part II.B.
258. See, e.g., Donald Greenless & David Lague, PetroChina Shares Triple Value in Record
IPO, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/05Jbusiness/
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public activity, market activity, and private conduct can be difficult to
draw. The WTO should retain tools at its disposal for drawing these
lines, and the fact-specific nature of this inquiry does suggest that
bright-line rules would be difficult to adopt. This Note's proposed
framework offers the WTO a flexible yet principled way in which to
approach the analysis, and a narrow application will serve both
practical and normative purposes.
V. CONCLUSION
In an influential article on the global distribution of power,
Jessica Mathews observes that the end of the Cold War brought on "a
novel redistribution of power among states, markets, and civil
society." 259 She goes on to write: "National governments are not simply
losing autonomy in a globalizing economy. They are sharing
powers ... with businesses, with international organizations, and
with multitudes of ... nongovernmental organizations. '" 260 Global
trends of the last three decades have increasingly favored private
enterprise and free markets over government intervention. 261 Private
certification and labeling systems with environmental missions are
among the businesses and NGOs with which states now share power.
They serve governance purposes only to the extent that consumers are
willing to pay for them. As such, they presumably support global
trends toward using private markets to solve public problems. If the
WTO chooses to exercise jurisdiction over a private labeling system
and subsequently rules as it has ruled on other labeling systems, it
may thereby deregulate the private regulators whose services people
want to buy.
The environmental problems posed by the growing
internationalization of trade are global in scale. With regard to
climate change in particular, the large and increasing quantities of
greenhouse gases emitted since the Industrial Revolution have been
termed the greatest market failure of our time. 262 At this stage of
worldbusiness/05iht-5bubble.8186962.html?_r=l&pagewanted=all (describing PetroChina as
"the state oil and gas giant," noting its listing on the New York Stock Exchange).
259. Jessica Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50, 50 (1997).
260. Id.
261. Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of
Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J. SOc. 297,
297 (2007).
262. NICHOLAS STERN ET AL., THE STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 105
(2006).
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scientific understanding about climate change, however, those large
and increasing quantities could be termed a governance failure as
well. And as any trip to the local grocery store may suggest, private
markets have begun to fill the gap left by public governance.
Private environmental governance may not provide first-best
solutions, but in the face of ongoing public inaction on climate in
particular, it fills gaping holes in global governance. When confronted
with the issue of whether to exercise jurisdiction over a private
environmental-labeling system, the WTO should acknowledge its
placement and purpose in the network of global governance. Although
its influence and authority are formidable, it is but one actor among
many. The WTO regulates trade, not the environment. The WTO
should adopt a narrow interpretation of the sufficient-government-
involvement analysis and let markets and environmental
organizations address the increasing need for attention to global
environmental challenges.
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